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perfected status, and thus could not prevail over the trustee's inclusion into the

bankrupt's estate. On July 1, 1971
§9-401 was amended to change the
proper place for filing' a financial statement from the circuit courts to the State
Department of Assessments and Taxation.
Instead of filing the third statement with
the Department, the creditor acted as he
had the first two instances and filed this
final statement with the Circuit Court.
The basic issue here was whether the final
statement modified the earlier filings. In
rejection of the trustee's argument, the
court conceded that the third filing was
ineffective, but that under §9-401 (d) such
error had no effect on the properly filed
statements.

Court Shoots
Down
Air Force
by Thomas G. Ross
Lawrence C. Dominic, Esq.
The August 30, 1977 decision in Mead
Data Central, Inc. v. United States
Department of the Air Force, et 0/. (No.
75-2218), _ _ U.S.App.D.C. _ _ ,
_ _ F.2d _ _ , concerned the' applicability and scope of exemption five of
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5
U.s.c. §552(b)(5)(1970 Supp. V 1975).
The appellant appealed from a summary
judgment in favor of the Air Force in
which the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied Mead Data's request for an injunction to compel the Air
Force to disclose the contents of seven
documents relating to a licensing agreement between the Air Force and the West
Publishing Company. The court held that
the requested documents were not subject
to disclosure because the fifth of nine exemptions enumerated within the FOIA
speCifically protected the Air Force
against mandatory release of the documents.
Enacted in 1966, the FOIA was intended to increase public access to

~

THE FORUM

government records and to encourage
agency responsibility. Congress, through
the Act, changed its policy from one
favoring nondisclosure of governmental
information (under the Administrative
Procedure Act [APA] of 1946) to one of
mandatory disclosure. Whereas the APA
was very restrictive and often abused, requiring access only to "persons properly
and directly concerned" with the matter,
the FOIA mandates disclosure of identifiable governmental records to "any person"
requesting them, subject to the nine
specific exemptions, and provides for
judicial remedy for a government agency's improper withholding of information.
86 HARv. L. REV. 1047-1048 (1973).
The United States Supreme Court in
N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 421
U.S. 132 (1975), held that the "purpose
of the [FOIA] is to establish a general
philosophy of full agency disclosure
unless information is exempted under
clearly delineated statutory language"
and that the Act's intent was to assure the
public's right of access to virtually all
governmental agency documents. The
Court reiterated its position on the FOIA's
function in Dept. of Air Force v. Rose,
425 U.S. 352 (1976), holding that "disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."
Congress did, however, recognize the
need to allow government agencies the
right of nondisclosure for certain documents. The information, to be protected,
must be within one of the following nine
specific exemptions:
1. national defense or foreign policy
interests;
2. agency's internal personnel rules
and practices;
3. specific statutory exemption;
4. trade secrets;
5. inter-agency or intra-agency
memoranda;
6. invasion of personal privacy;
7. investigatory files for law enforcement purposes;
8. regulation of financial institutions;
and
9. information concerning oil wells.
See 5 U.s.c. §§552(b)(1) through (9).
In Mead Data, the Air Force was successful at the trial court level after asserting a claim that the seven documents requested by Mead Data were privileged in

that they fell within exemption five of the
FOIA. That exemption, at 5 U.s.C.
§552(b)(5), states:

[The Act does not apply to] inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available by
law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency.

The broad and unclear language of exemption five thrusts upon the courts a
major role in the administration of the
Act. 86 HARv. L. REV. at 1066-67 (1973).
The two basic defense claims that can be
made to invoke the privilege under this
exemption are the attorney-client privilege and the privilege protecting those
memoranda involved in the deliberation
and deCision-making governmental process. See generally C. M. Marvick (Ed.),
Litigation Under the Amended Freedom
of Information Act (ACLU 1976).
The seven documents that Mead Data
sought to have disclosed dealt with an Air
Force project involving a computerized
legal research system. Of these, the Air
Force claimed that three were legal opinions in which Air Force attorneys were advising their client as to applicable law
concerning contract negotiations. The Air
Force further asserted that the other four
documents were privileged as internal
memoranda prepared by its employees.
Mead Data argued that the information
requested was purely factual and thus
subject to disclosure, while the Air Force
asserted that it consisted of adViSory opinions and deliberations protected from disclosure by exemption five.
The circuit court agreed with the trial
court's ruling that both the attorney-client
and deliberative process privileges are incorporated into exemption five. However,
it reversed the judgment of the district
court due to its "impermissibly broad interpretation" of these privileges and remanded for a decision based on narrower
constructions outlined in the case. No.
75-2218 slip op. at 34. The court noted
that the congressional intent was that the
exemption be applied "as narrowly as
consistent with efficient government
operation." Id., at 11, n. 16; S. Rep. No.
813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).

ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE
While the court viewed this privilege as
necessary to maintain the quality and independence of agency decision-making, it
ordered the disclosure of the three documents on remand unless the Air Force
could meet its burden by sufficient demonstration of the applicability of the privilege to this situation. Agreeing that the
documents were products of the attorneyclient relationship, the court, however,
refused to hold them exempt under the
privilege absent a showing by the Air
Force that one document was confidential
in itself and that two others were based on
confidential information provided by the
client. In the first case, one document
sought to be withheld was known and disclosed to parties outside of the attorneyclient relationship (West Publishing Co.);
as to the other two the Air Force sought
to protect under the privilege theory, it
was found that they were not based on information "supplied by the Air Force with
the expectation of secrecy." Id. at 14-18.

DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE
(Internal Memoranda)
This privilege turns on the distinction
between information which is essentially
factual and documents involving deliberation and policy-making. The Supreme
Court held that the former requires disclosure, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 72
(1973), while documents revealing agency policy making and deliberative processes may be withheld. Id. at 19-20.
Of the four documents the Air Force
sought to withhold under this privilege,
one was found to be exempt from disclosure. As to two others, the court stated
that its policy of "promoting the free flow
of ideas" protected from disclosure those
parts of the documents reflecting the
opinions of Air Force employees concerning the status of negotiations with West.
Slip op. at 22. The court found that the
fourth document, dealing with various
offers and counter-offers by both West
and the Air Force, was not exempt simply
because it reflected "negotiating positions" prior to a final contract. While such
deliberations within an agency structure

are protected, those involving an outside
party are not. The court remanded to
compel disclosure of this document and
any parts of the others dealing with
specific negotiations with West. Id. at
22-24.

SEGREGABILITY
The court went on to hold that the Air
Force had not adequately justified its
claim that the requested documents contained no non-exempt information that
could be ·"reasonably segregable" from
that information the Air Force asserted to
be privileged under exemption five. The
court further directed that an agency is required to provide an adequate description
of a document's content and its reasons
for belieVing the information to be nonsegregable before refUSing to disclose. Id.
at 2.
"The focus of the FOIA is information,
not documents, and an agency cannot
justify withholding an entire document
simply by showing it contains some exempt material." Slip op. at 27-28.
On remand, the Air Force was ordered
to provide a detailed justification for withholding the seven documents. In addition,
the court stated that a further requirement
of a party asserting that the information in
a document was not segregable from exempted information is a description of the
portion of information contained in a file
that is non-exempt and how that information is dispersed throughout the entire
document. The court reasoned that this
information would better enable a court
to establish the validity of an agency's
assertion that non-privileged information
was not segregable from that which was
exempt. Id. at 29-30, 34.

A narrow construction of exemption
five places it in its proper context. For the
attorney-client privilege to possess any
gravity it must be circumscribed to protect communication between the lawyer
and her client which is made with reliance
on secrecy. The expectation of confidentiality is often a condition precedent to
any communication at all. Where parties'
deliberations are protected to permit the
"free flow of ideas" without threat of disclosure, opinion making and discussion
flourishes. In the agency milieu, however,
that crucial expectation of confidentiality
is limited. Where attorney-client consultations demand secrecy in order to
meet an objective, and where administrative deliberations must be confidential to
avoid a chill on the "free flow of ideas,"
the exemption shall apply. Not intended
by the Congress was protection of the
mundane communication within the agency context, information necessarily subject to examination by third parties or the
frustration of the public's reasonable right
to access to information of its government.

Prejudicial
Joinder
by John Jeffrey Ross

John Lee McKnight was arrested and
accused of committing four robberies
within the same area of Baltimore during
a single month in 1974. After an unsuccessful motion to sever the informations
joined in a single prosecution under Mary-
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